Network Neutrality and the Samurai

January 10th, 2010

The ITU Association of Japan just published my September keynote on Network Neutrality in the Highlights section of its January 2010 ITU AJ Journal.  The article is password protected, but if you are a member of the Association, you can get it from the website. (The article is in Japanese).

One of the points I made in the keynote (which is not in the brief article), was an analogy of Network Neutrality issues to Edō Period Japan.  The sankin kōtai laws of the Tokugawa Shogunate imposed a rule of prioritization on the Tokaido and Nakaseido roads between Edō (now, Tokyo) and Kyoto, as well as on other “kaido” emanating from the capital.  Access to Japanese roads was prioritized by social status, with only the Samurai class having access to the center of the road as their procession called a daimyo gyoretsu passed.  Lower classes were required to clear the road kneel down and bow as the Samurai passed.  Punishment for failing to clear the road was possible decapitation.

The concept of prioritization is not new, but it is universal.  It expresses fundamental and competing notions of fairness versus economic efficiency.  We think it is unfair to give preferential treatment to certain customers (those who are willing to pay more or have higher social status).  At the same time, we also think it is economically inefficient to mandate a single (or limited set of) Internet access options for everyone, including those who are willing to pay more for premium services.  When the network (or Tokkaido Road) is congested, prioritization can make users better off.  Prioritization can be accomplished based on economic characteristics, arrival order, processing load, urgency, or even social status.

Insight: Since all messages on an IP-based network travel at the same speed (the speed of light), in discussions of Network Neutrality, it is never who gets to go faster, rather which packet, or which samurai, gets to go first.  Such prioritization must be done in a way which is socially permissible and economically desirable.  Given that the penalty for breaching a classes of service restrains in Edo Japan was capital, I think I would rather get a reset packet.

Next Generation Spectrum Regulation

December 9th, 2009
Spectrum band plan created by price-guided mechanisms

Spectrum band plan created by price-guided mechanisms

Winston Churchill famously said, “democracy is the worst form of government except all the others that have been tried.”  Perhaps the same can be said of spectrum auctions.  Auction mechanisms have been used starting in New Zealand in 1994 to award spectrum licenses to those who have the highest monetary value. Spectrum auctions have generally been highly effective, with the occasional failure.

Despite their success, auctions have some notable drawbacks such as the so-called winners curse and the fact the up-front license fees require spectrum users to raise capital beyond the princely sums necessary to build a wireless network – a barrier to entry.  However, auctions are far better than the administrative processes which have been used for nearly a century to determine spectrum assignments.  Administrative decisions tend not to be economically efficient because the regulator has limited access to information which market participants would be more able to amass and utilize. There are also problems of political independence and of regulatory capture.

While auctions have been used to determine who gets spectrum rights, they have not really been used to determine the contours of those rights.  These contours are still determined through administrative decisions.

I have just completed a major study on next generation spectrum regulation which can serve as the basis for removing certain barriers to spectrum access, allowing more effective sharing and efficient allocations.

I can think of no reason why a properly designed auction could not determine not only who gets the spectrum rights, but what those rights are.  (Think of it this way: an auction on eBay for a car could determine not just who gets the car, but the color of the car and whether it comes with, say, leather seats or alloy wheels.)  I built a mathematical model of a next-generation spectrum auction using the Shannon-Hartley Theorem as a means modeling behavior by valuing the spectrum when considering the actions of other would-be users.  In my model bidders could express their demands for not just bandwidth, but power, modulation, underlay/interference, and other characteristics.  When I ran an MS Excel-based version of the model, the result was a mix of high and low power uses in the winning bids.  The low power bidders (similar to UWB spectral densities) could in a second round be aggregated into some form of licensed commons with the coordination protocol determined in that part of the auction.  The outcome would resemble a shared use or common arrangement where no one party controlled the spectrum.  However, the most interesting thing was that because bidders could obtain spectrum allocations that more closely fit their needs, more than 40% of the spectrum bandwidth available in the auction was left unsold.  This spectrum was valued by the market to be best allocated to either public sector use or even low- to mid-power unlicensed use.

Insight:  You cannot see, touch, taste, smell, or hear radio spectrum.  Spectrum is not a thing; it is an idea – a legal and engineering construct that explains a physical phenomenon and helps us arrange our behavior accordingly.  That fundamental physical phenomenon is the fact that when electromagnetic waves are: (1) harmonic in frequency; (2) incident in time; and (3) alight on the same reception device, the ability of those waves to be used as information carriers is degraded.  This deleterious effect is known to us as interference.  Without some form of intervention, it is impossible to exclude or limit the use of a common resource such as spectrum. Without exclusion, users consume the spectrum without regard to fact that their usage causes the deleterious effect of interference for other would-be users.  Policies which help to mitigate inference with the least amount of effort will be the most socially beneficial.

Japan Communications’ New Business Model

October 28th, 2009

On my October business trip to Tokyo, I took time to meet with Japan Communications‘ CEO Frank Sanda.  I know Frank from my work on the Eamon Ryan’s Advisory Forum on Broadband.  I wanted to see Frank and his team because they just launched a new product for Hewlett-Packard.  HP will now sell netbooks in Japan which come with 100 minutes of mobile wireless connectivity. Consumers can buy connectivity on a pay-as-you-go basis from Japan Communications, but branded as an HP service.

Japan Communications built a really cool billing system to handle payment and authentication.  But, Japan Communications does not have a wireless network.  That it gets from the leading carrier NTT DoCoMo. Japan Communications leases capacity on DoCoMo’s network nationwide, and has the ability to purchase more capacity as this business grows. HP gets to determine which devices are sold and can sell the connectivity as its own.  Furthermore, Japan Communications could set up such a system to sell anyone else’s networked devices.  Say, how about a Carterfone?

While Japan Communications negotiated with DoCoMo to get on its network, it was able to do so because the Japanese Ministry for Communications and Information created which rules opened the networks of three largest wireless operators DoCoMo, KDDI, and SoftBank to wholesale. There was apparently a three-year battle at the Ministry in which Japan Communications was at the center. Japan’s policy to require wholesale access to wireless networks goes further than the US FCC’s rules for its 700 MHz auction which mandated these open these networks to foreign devices and handsets.

Insight: This seems like a really cool business model with implications for carriers, devices manufacturers, and application service providers around the world. I have said in a previous Cool Stuff, it is not a questions of whether wireless networks should be open or closed. Rather, there is some optimal level of openness which will maximize the carrier’s return.  A privately determined level of openness will no doubt diverge from a level of openness which represents a public optimal. However, this begs the question whether opening networks to wholesale in this way is good policy and whether the Europe and the US should follow suit.  The answer is far more complex than can be addressed in a humble blog entry.  Nonetheless, I am curious see how this market will develop.

Cool Cube

October 24th, 2009
C is for CUBE

C is for CUBE. The School has its own hand sign.

On my trip to Japan earlier this month, I was invited by my good friend Prof. Harumasa Sato to speak to his undergraduate students at the Konan University in Kobe.  Prof. Sato did not ask me to talk about spectrum, Net Neutrality, interconnection, or some other issue in communications.  Rather, he asked me to speak to his students about my life and international career experience.  Since this is the inaugural year for the school, so I was delighted to address the students.

Prof. Sato is the Dean of the new business school and spent the past three years setting it up. And, what can I say for his efforts?  It’s totally fucking cool.  The school is referred to as “CUBE”, aptly named for the building cube-like shape.  Prof. Sato roams the halls speaking to his students. (When I was in business school, and the students saw the Dean coming, they went the other way).  Inside, the building is a fantastic mix of high-tech classrooms, work spaces, meeting spaces, and offices. The main lounge is an English-only “O-Zone” so that the students can practice their business English.  The TV in the lounge is not a TV, it’s a Mac streaming YouTube.  Everything is wireless, including room lighting controls, projection monitors, and the contactless RFID security passes, which are in cell phones. Students use their cell phones not only as security cards to gain entrance to certain areas of the building, but to buy drinks from the vending machines.

Insight:  Kids today, I tell you.  They don’t know how cool they’ve got it.  My time at CUBE got me thinking about my own undergraduate experience.  As a college student, I spent Spring and Summer semesters junior year studying in Japan.  I cannot imagine how different my education would have been had we had these technologies and the wide-spread adoption of the Internet.

Volts for Clunkers

August 7th, 2009
Source: Coneee, flickr.com, used under creative commons.

Source: Coneee, flickr.com, used under creative commons.

In the past week, there has been a lot of talk about the US federal government’s “Cash for Clunkers” program.  By most accounts, the program has been quite popular.  Indeed, the program’s original $1 billion in funding was exhausted in about two weeks, prompting Congress to vote another $2 billion for the program this past week.

Under the program, consumers can trade-in an old car which gets less than 18 MPG towards the purchase of a new car.  The consumer gets a credit equal to the scrap value of the car, plus $3,500 to $4,500.  The car dealership then takes the traded-in car, pours solvent into the engine to ruin the lubricating oil, and runs it until the engine seizes.  The car is then junked for scrap.  More than 230,000 cars have been traded in under the program so far.

Insight:  In junking the clunker cars, we are about to throw a whole bunch of babies out the bath water.  It consumes a tremendous about of  natural resources to produce an automobile.  So, while it is good to get a quarter million 18-MPG or less motors off of the road, it does not make sense to crush all of those cars to leave them to rust in a junk yard.  In fact, it is a bit of an environmental nightmare.

I suggest that the Cash for Clunkers Program consider a plan which permits rolling-up the clunkers, removing their seized engines, and converting the cars to electric vehciles.

Internal combustion engines have had their day, but sooner or later they will have to give way to a more efficient system.  Because of the ability to quickly replenish the vehicle’s energy supply with cheap oil, internal combustion engines are convenient, but they are truly wasteful. Internal combustion engines are perpetually trying to tear themselves apart from the inside and turn most of their chemical and kinetic energy to heat.

So, in light of not having to produce more steal and generate more waste in the production, the electrification of existing vehicles makes some sense. To electrify the cars, requires removing the internal combustion engine and the fuel system and replacing them with an electric motor and battery system.  Pretty much everything else in the cars stays.  The conversion to electric is not all that hard to do.  In fact, DIYers are already doing conversions in their garages – takes about 40 to 100 hours and good set of tools.  Nearly all electric cars are already conversions.  Even the macdaddy of electric vehicles – the Telsa Roadster – is just a pumped up Lotus Elise with better aerodynamics and giant cordless phone battery.  And, despite the fact that the clunkers used cars, they are still attractive for conversion.  Since an electric motor has a single moving part, a well-done electric conversion can be expected to last for over 1 million miles.  Further, used cars have already gone through a break-in period so there is a lot less friction in the bearings and drivetrains.

As a threshold problem, one would need to determine statistically which makes and models are being traded in as clunkers.  Further, one would have to determine, from an engineering stand point, which of the most makes and models could be converted to electric cars.  Finally, a business case would have to be completed in order to determine whether conversions of these vehicles could be done at minimum viable scale.

We can do this.  After all, we already own GM and it is idling factories and laying-off workers.

The electrified clunkers could then be sold a low cost to be used as daily commuter cars.  This would have a multiplier effect for both the economic and environmental dimensions of the program.

NB:  I do not argue that electric cars are an environmental panacea.  First, the electricity used to charge the cars has to be generated in a carbon-neutral way. Second, more than 90% the alloys need to make high efficiency electric motors comes from China.  This would have the effect of changing geopolitical power from oil-exporting countries to a single nation.  However, the present situation is unsustainable.

International Perspective – Allocating Blue and Amber Light Spectrum

June 17th, 2009

Westminster eForum Keynote Seminar: Emergency Services & Public Safety Spectrum
11 June 2009
Remarks as edited.

Introduction

Good morning. I would like to begin by thanking David Happy and the Tetra Association for inviting me here to speak to you.  I would also like to thank Thomas Raynsford for doing everything in his power to get me here today.  I would like to not thank the London Underground for doing everything in its power to not get me here today.

My name is Kenneth Carter.  I am an American who works for WIK-Consult in Bonn, Germany.  Our firm advises both public- and private-sector clients on issues related to network economics, strategy and policy. Previously, I was Senior Counsel in the Office of Strategic Planning at the US Federal Communications Commission and the Deputy Director of the Columbia Institute for Tele-Information at Columbia University.  I hold both juris doctorate and a master’s of business administration degrees.

It is a great pleasure for me to be here in London today to talk about amber light and blue light spectrum.  To be absolutely honest this is my second choice.  I wanted to go to Amsterdam to talk about “red light” spectrum.  I can assure you they would be talking about a different type of “siren call” at the other event.

I am here to talk to you about the US experience in trying to create a dedicated band for public safety networks and its attempt to auction that spectrum to the highest bidder.

Background

In 2007, the US Federal Communications Commission commenced proceedings to create an auction for the spectrum in the 700 MHz band for use in a nation-wide network public safety.  This part of the auction was called the D Block.  The spectrum was being released as part of the US transition to digital terrestrial television.  The FCC paired a single 10 MHz wide license with an adjacent 12 MHz wide public safety block in the band.  The auction rules specified a $1.3 billion reserve price for the auction based on 110% of the estimated cost of relocating incumbent federal users of the spectrum in order to clear the band.  The commercial winner of the license at auction would be required to negotiate with a Public Safety Spectrum Trust organization to build such a network in a private-public partnership. The commercial licensee would be permitted to use the 12 MHz of public safety spectrum on a preemptable basis.  The license came with a build out requirement to provide coverage of 75%, 95%, and 99.3% of the population in four, seven and ten years respectively.

Two prime potential candidates for this license emerged.  One was named Cyren Call, the other Frontline Wireless.  Shortly before the auction, Frontline lost the backing of its investors and was forced to withdraw. The auction proceeded and a single bid of $472 million was placed by Qualcomm.  This bid was only 35% of the $1.3 billion reserve price set by the FCC.  The auction concluded without a license being assigned.

The auction was immediately decried as a failure by the industry and the blogisphere.

Analysis

Well, what went wrong?  We don’t know for sure, since we cannot really ask Frontline’s investors.  However, at least four reasons have been put forth.

1.  Writing on the blog Wetmachine, Harold Feld lays out the case that the head of Cyren Call Morgan O’Brien may have tried to scuttle the plans with Frontline’s investors.  Cyren Call had become an advisor to the Public Safety Spectrum Trust.  This presented a certain conflict of interest.  Mr. O’Brien is alleged to have informed Frontline’s investors that the Public Safety Spectrum Trust would charge the commercial licensee $500 million in spectrum usage fees for the preemptable spectrum, over the course of the license.  These fees would be over and above what Frontline would have to pay in terms of spectrum license fees and the costs of constructing and maintaining the network.

2.  Under the FCC’s rules, there was a certain amount of ambiguity regarding the rights and responsibilities of commercial licensee vis-à-vis the Public Safety Spectrum Trust.  In the event of a disagreement in negotiations between the commercial licensee and the Public Safety Spectrum Trust, the FCC had the power to intervene and determine the outcome of that disagreement.  In the wake of the September 11th Terrorist Attacks, no public official, either elected or appointed, can be painted to look weak on public safety. So, if the Public Safety Spectrum Trust were to request something which is perhaps unnecessary and unprofitable, but not irrational, it is likely that Commission officials would side with the Trust and against the commercial licensee.

3.  This problem may have been compounded by issues of personality.  FCC Chairman Kevin Martin’s pick to lead the newly formed Public Safety Homeland Security Bureau was Derek Poarch.  Chief Poarch was previously head of the police department of the University of North Carolina, Chairman Martin’s undergraduate alma mater.  Given, that Chief Poarch had no track record in Washington spectrum policy matters, Frontline’s investors had no means to anticipate whether he would handle matters equitably in regard to the negotiations with the Public Safety Spectrum Trust.

4.  Finally, the commercial licensee could potentially be exposed to unlimited liability for tort claims arising from the operation of its network.  During the September 11th Terrorist Attacks, the New York City firefighters inside the Twin Towers perished because they did not receive the evacuation order due to the fact that their radio equipment did not function properly inside the high-rise buildings.  Many police officers heard the call over their radio system and evacuated safely.  The prospect of that type of law suit and the associated liability is something that most investors would reasonably shy away from. This is especially true when coupled with the fact that there is some chance that the preemptable spectrum would not “fail safe”, allowing commercial uses to interfere with public safety uses.

In the D-Block auction, it is not necessarily the market which failed.  Rather the outcome was determined by the decisions of a few handfuls of investors in a single firm. Or maybe even the actions of a single individual.  In sum, there was probably too much uncertainty and too many restrictions for Frontline to conclude it could earn a positive return on its investment in order to bid for this spectrum.

The result is that today, June 11th,  is the last full day of analog terrestrial broadcasting in the United States and tomorrow, when the US switches to DTV and the analog frequencies become available, Americans will still be waiting for their national public safety network.

Conclusion

So, what are the lessons for the United Kingdom?  If a nation is to pursue market-based or price-informed spectrum policy for public safety, it must do so extremely judiciously.  It must be aware of how all incentives and uncertainty might affect or distort the outcome.

Generally, I am a proponent of price-guided spectrum policy.  Market forces are generally highly effective at allocating rights to their highest monetary value recipients. They can rationalize administrative determinations of who, what, and how much.  However, they do not work particularly well for public safety concerns.

In fact, markets run the risk of creating perverse incentives for public safety.  This is because, unlike other economic goods, there are no good substitutes for the inputs or outputs.  An actuarial can calculate a value of a lost life.  But, if it is your life, the value is infinite, perhaps a little more for your children.  Similarly, public safety can have no substitute for its radio communications.  You can really long telephone cord on the back of each fire truck, ambulance, and police car?!

Since we cannot leave it to the market to decide how much of the good ” public safety” to produce, we must address as a policy matter the trade-off between the possibility of administratively allocating a block of spectrum which is in some way too much or too little.  The cost of getting a determination which is “suboptimal” may pale in the face of the possibility of a failed allocation.  Thus, it may instead be more efficient to make an administrative determination about the spectrum assignment award it to a government entity which will take responsibility for construction and operation of the network.  Now, some part of that might be outsourced, but still the Government maintains the responsibility.

In the UK, you will soon have to make an allocation for the next generation public safety networks – the “son of Tetra”.  Ofcom will have to comment the production of a business case for that allocation.  Perhaps it is preferable not to let the perfect be the enemy of the good and may an acceptable, albeit suboptimal allocation.

A year ago, I coauthored a White Paper for Motorola and EADS urging the allocation of two additional 15 MHz wide blocks from the Digital Dividend to a pan-European, dedicated band for mission critical broadband networks for public safety.  This is inline with the US allocation from its Digital Dividend; however, the US already has 97.2 MHz nation-wide for public safety.  Europe, by comparison, has only 10 MHz.

It would seem to me that commonsense alone tells you that additional spectrum is needed since the principal duty of the State is the protection of its citizens, and for the UK to be at the very forefront of developments.

I thank you for your time and attention, and look forward to your questions.

Stefano Merli’s Net Neutrality Paradox

May 16th, 2009

Source: foxypar4, flickr.com.  Used with permission.

Source: foxypar4, flickr.com. Used with permission.

This past week, I gave a keynote speech in Rome on Network Neutrality.  At lunch afterwards, I had a lovely conversation with Italian researcher Stefano Merli.  He presented me with the following paradox:  The theory of Network Neutrality is that we impose rules to ensure openness and, more importantly, freedom of use on the Internet.  However, the imposition of a rule, by its very nature, limits freedom. Thus, we are limiting freedom to ensure freedom.

Insight:  It’s an excellent paradox.  The only resolution which I could come to is that the regulator, on behalf of private citizens, imposes rules on network operators.  While restricting the operators’ freedom affords private Internet users greater freedom of use.

So, I wonder if this is a ‘transfer’ of freedom from one group to another, how do we know that we have the correct set of rules.  Then I thought of the weight of cows.  What can the weight of cows tell us about Network Neutrality?  You might think I have gone mentally ill.  Indulge me for a moment.  If asked what the average weight of a cow was, you could venture a guess.  The quality of your guess, i.e., how close it was to the actual average, would be a function of your life experience.  If you grew up on a dairy farm or work in livestock, your guess probably would be closer to the average value than mine, because I grew up in Manhattan.  Now, if I asked a 100 people, or 1,000, or 10,000, then the average of those responses would tend to converge on the actual value.  This is the “Wisdom of Crowds“.   One of the most important lessons I learned in business school is one can be smarter than anyone in the room, but he can’t be smarter than everyone in the room. Vox populi, vox Dei.

Similarly, the set of Network Neutrality rules imposed by the regulator is, in essence, one person’s guess.  If we have thousands, or tens of thousands, of people ‘guessing’ at the appropriate rules – a market – then we will eventually converge on a correct value.

Neutralità della rete e aspetti socio-economici

May 15th, 2009

The conceptual foundations and the economics Network Neutrality

Remarks as Prepared for Delivery

Good Morning and thank you for that warm introduction.  It is truly a pleasure for me to speak to you this morning.  Before I begin, I would like to thank Stefano Quintarelli for inviting me and the Fondazione Ugo Bordoni for hosting me here today.  I would also like to thank Sebastiano Trigila and his staff for their terrific help in arranging this event.

We would like to think of Network Neutrality as being in the vanguard – one the leading edge issues in communications.  Well, while the implementations may be new, the ideas are old.  For example, in our research project at the WIK, we found a reference to an 1848 law in New York State which mandated that telegraph companies provide non-discriminatory service to individuals and to competing telegraph companies.  Substitute the word datagram for telegram, and you have a Network Neutrality regulation.

Yet, the debate goes back even further.  What is truly at the core of the debate is common carriage versus private carriage. It is in fact particularly fitting that we are here today in the Eternal City to discuss this ideas. Common Carriage – the duty to service all customers without discrimination – traces its origins to the laws of the Roman Empire.

As such, common and private carriage express fundamental and competing notions of fairness versus economic efficiency. We think it is unfair to give preferential treatment to certain customers (those who are willing to pay more).  At the same time, we also think it is economically inefficient to mandate a single (or limited set of) Internet access options for everyone, including those who are willing to pay more for premium services. So, how does one determine which means of achieving differentiated services is socially permissible and economically desirable?

The answer to that question depends on a variety of things.  The question itself is like a Rorschach test.  Look at Network Neutrality, tell me what you see, and I will tell you whom you work for, your educational background, your political ideology, your stock portfolio, and maybe even something about your personality.  This is perhaps why the debate in the United States created strange and almost surreal coalitions including the religious right, the American Civil Liberties Union, left-of-center netroots organizations and the Gun Owners of America.  Opponents on both sides of the issues agree on one thing, if their agenda is not adopted as regulatory policy, innovation and investment will be stifled and consumer welfare and overall economic activity will suffer.  Much of the public policy debate has been the external face of a private bargaining problem involving upstream content providers and downstream network providers.

The term Network Neutrality has come to describe all manner of sin.  There is no generally agreed upon definition for Network Neutrality and deviations or violations against the principle.   It is a catch-all phrase that emerged in the United States over the past decade and has come to reflect a number of potential behaviors that some have considered to be anticompetitive. Network Neutrality implies that all IP packets should be treated more-or-less the equally, and the debate reflects concerns that they might not be in the future – that a network operator might somehow apply different treatment to IP packets associated with different services, applications, destinations or devices.

The term Network Neutrality is, at best, a loaded one. It implies that any deviation from its principles is not neutral, and in some way unfair. In many instances, it is perfectly fair to provide preferential treatment to some network uses, say premium customers or emergency services. However, the opponents of Network Neutrality had devised a counter term which is almost equally misleading. In recent discussions involving the US FCC, the term network management practices has come to take the place of the term Network Neutrality.  While the semantics of this term might be more objective, it does not accurately describe the nature of the problem.  Network management refers to a much broader scope of activities including business practices, sales and marketing, security, fault tolerance, and capacity planning. Since the issues present in this debate represent only a narrow slice of network management.  This term was not picked at random, but comes from a US FCC decision which I will discuss a bit later.

Furthermore, Network Neutrality covers a broad range of behaviors, which at the extreme are clear acceptable or not clearly not acceptable.  Again, how do we decide which are tolerable which are not. The behaviors at the ends most people would agree are or are not acceptable.  The challenge comes in determining which of the behaviors in the middle are acceptable.  I fully expect that I will show this slide one day and be told by some Estonian botnet herder that customer requested SPAM filters are not acceptable under Network Neutrality.  This challenge is made more difficult by the fact that these behaviors can be insidious and difficult to detect.  Network operators are loathe to disclosing the precise contours of their network management for legitimate reasons of competitive advantages and network security.  Most Internet subscribers are not sophisticated enough to detect deviations from Network Neutrality on their own.

Well, further compounding the problem is the fact that Network Neutrality presents the classic problem of the elephant and the blind men. This may be due to the fact that a single network practice may give rise to several different economic, policy and technological issues, involving several different classes of persons. Given that there is little agreement on what exactly Network Neutrality is and there is no common language to describe the issues, I set out to create taxonomy designed to articulate and characterise different types of Network Neutrality issues.  It is my hope that this set of classifications will become widely used because it will give us a langua Franca to describe the things we disagree about.  I hope that this taxonomy will make the debate more objective and approachable, and help to reduce the ever-present hyperbole.

In order to describe the nature of relationships in an interconnected-multilateral-all-IP network world, we can characterize relationships among network participants and service providers as being one three dimensions: vertical, horizontal, or diagonal. Vertical conflicts are those between players in the value chain – content sources, network operators, and endusers. Issues between subscriber and provider are typically those of market power. Horizontal conflicts are those between persons in the same link of the network value chain. Horizontal conflicts arise between, says, endusers competing for finite bandwidth in the access network. The horizontal issues which arise are related to pool problems or issues of bargaining power.  Common pool resources are one type of economic good which is rivalrous and non-excludable.  That is a fancy way of saying that the inherent characteristics of the good make it such that one person’s enjoyment of it, diminishes another person’s, and there is no means of preventing individuals from consuming it. In common pool resources, people tend to consume the good without respect to their negative impact on others, leading to a level of consumption which might reduce overall benefit from the good.

Our so-called diagonal conflicts arise when the actions of one party affect the benefits received by a party on a completely autonomous network. Diagonal issues present the most fertile ground for the Network Neutrality debate and issues of first impression.  We observe many of the experiences of Network Neutrality arise when Internet-based networks insinuates itself into the communications and contractual relationships of users who do not directly subscribe to it. Consider the following situation depicted in the Figure, were entities 1 and 2 are access networks and A, B, and C are endusers. Further suppose that Networks 1 and 2 are interconnected, and endusers A and B are both customers of 1. C is a customer of Network 2. We use the vertical dimension describe the network participant’s place in the value chain, i.e., network provider or enduser. An example of a vertical issue would be Network 1’s blocking or degrading of non-affiliated content to its customers A and B. If endusers A and B are competing for network resources, this would be an example of a horizontal issue. Similarly, deviations from Network Neutrality in terms of interconnection between Networks 1 and 2 would also be along a horizontal dimension.  Somewhat more complex is an example of an diagonal issue which might be the case where Network 1 would block or degrade enduser C’s (who is not its customer) ability to exchange messages with its customer, enduser B. An example of this is the Comcast case which I will discuss later on.

Most people discuss the “speed” data networks.  This term is not precise. The more precise description is the end-to-end delay or data transfer rate.  For the Network Neutrality debate, jitter, and packet loss are also particularly relevant measures of network performance.

This transfer rate is much a function of latency and delay.  Delay in an IP network can be compared to waiting times on a ski lift. In the figure, skiers face a variable queuing delay when standing in line to get on the ski lift. The length of the variable delay is based on the number of skiers trying to get on the lift, and the number of skiers that can board per minute. Each skier faces a fixed delay (latency) once on the chair, based on the length of the lift cable and the constant speed at which it moves.  (I assume that the speed of the cable can not be increased). In this analogy, overall delay is the total time that it takes to get up the lift from the moment that one enters the queue at the bottom of the ski slope to the time that one disembarks at the top of the mountain.

The latency can be viewed as being roughly the time to get a packet through the network if there were no contention for resources whatsoever. For each communications link, it is a function of the speed of light through the transmission medium of which the link is comprised, and the length of the link (or the ski lift cable in this example). As long as the end-to-end communications path does not change, the latency of an end-to-end communication can be viewed as being a constant.

Queuing delays, however, are highly variable. For each transmission link in a packet’s path, the packet can be viewed as having been placed on a waiting line (a queue) while it seeks to gain access to the transmission link. The routers that forward packets have substantial buffers in which they maintain waiting lines of packets; however, these buffers are not unlimited. If the offered load is greater than the capacity of the link, the waiting line will get longer, and will eventually overrun the size of the buffer, no matter how large. Routers respond to this condition by simply discarding excess packets, which normally causes no harm for data applications such as email.

Nothing can make the network (or the ski lift) go faster. Rather, prioritised queuing determines which packets are delayed more (or dropped altogether) when the network is heavily loaded or overloaded. Consider again the analogy of the ski lift. When the waiting lines are long, we might wish to be favoured by a prioritised express line.  So, in discussions of Network Neutrality, it is not who gets to go faster, rather who gets to go first.

If we all were the same there would be little concern for Network Neutrality or for regulation for that matter.  But we are different and we differ in a variety of dimensions.  These two diagrams show how different applications require different things from the network.  Some applications such as two-way video require high bandwidth and low overall delay.  While email, might only require low bandwidth and can tolerate higher latency.  At present, we are putting heterogeneous demands on what was largely designed as a homogeneous network.  This is sure to cause conflicts as heterogeneous users contend for limited capacity.

Let’s talk for a moment about access networks.  In discussing Network Neutrality issues, we tend to focus exclusively on access network issues because this is where competition issues tend to be the most problematic.  Consider a plain-vanilla broadband internet connection.  All of the capacity in the circuit can be used for just about any IP-based application.  Now consider a more complicated cable- or fiber-based network.  While it may appear to be a single network, it is really three, or so, networks sharing the same wire or fiber.  Indeed, there might be three completely separate sets of network equipment attached at either end of the line – Internet modem, cable box and phone terminal.  When we talk about Network Neutrality, we tend to focus solely on the Internet component.  But the other networks, certainly the video programming component is not neutral.  Certain frequencies in the network have been reserved, and prioritized for certain applications.  So, why such a focus for the Internet component? Perhaps this is because it is the most important for the future of communications.

Many of the concerns that have been raised in regard to Network Neutrality relate to behaviors that, in the absence of market power, would tend to enhance consumer welfare. In a competitive market, these practices would be entirely appropriate.  Competition is one of four essential ingredients for mitigating the negative impacts of deviations from Network Neutrality.  The other three are: well informed consumers; low switching costs; and economic feedback loops that provide proper incentives.  The presence of these four factors means that regulators have less work to do in order to ensure that welfare-enhancing differentiation does not devolve into welfare-diminishing discrimination.  Network neutrality also brings into play economic issues including price discrimination, network externalities, transaction costs, switching costs, two-sided markets, and the economics of vertical foreclosure.  Only some of which I will talk about today.

Opponents of Network Neutrality intervention frequently point to the most common problems and claim that this is a two sided market, which if left to its own devices will sort out an efficient, market clearing price.  A two sided market is a fairly common arrangement where a market maker, must successfully bring together participants in two classes of persons in order to make a profit.  The classic example is the bar owner who may give away free drinks at a “lady’s night” ensure a sufficient number of women in order to attract men as paying customers.  In networks, this might be the cable television provider who must attract a certain number of viewers in order to attract program provides and to be able to sell advertising, and vice versa.  In some cases, the programmer is selling advertising and in some cases the cable provider is.  Two sided markets can be complex in that subsidizing one side with zero, or even negative prices, can be rational and even welfare enhancing.  Now imagine that we are talking about the Internet.  Here the threat to Network Neutrality is the market maker attempting to extract a rent from the programmer’s advertiser – someone with whom he does not have privity of contract.  This is, to use the language of our three dimensions, a diagonal issue.  The fear of this “toll gate” problem is probably what brought together strange coalitions in the US.  It probably would not fly in a competitive market, since it has little to do with bringing the two sides together.  Where there is little or no competition, it is most likely an unacceptable practice.

Let me change gears a bit and talk about Network Neutrality in the US.  Why did it take so long for Network Neutrality to become a real problem in the US? Deviations have been technically feasible for more than ten year.  Telecommunications firms in the US were not permitted to discriminate (prior to 2005), but cable operators were unrestricted. The problem has heated up in the US coincident with the decline of competitive broadband alternatives for consumers.  This was also coincident with an aggressively deregulatory time period.

In August of 2005, the FCC adopted a Broadband Policy Statement. This statement does not have the enforceable weight of a Commission rule, but the Commission committed to incorporating these principles into future policymaking. The policy principles in the Statement were intended to “ensure that broadband networks are widely deployed, open, affordable, and accessible to all consumers.” The Statement further set out four entitlements for consumers which it felt necessary to further this goal:

  • consumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet content of their choice.
  • consumers are entitled to run applications and use services of their choice, subject to the needs of law enforcement.
  • consumers are entitled to connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm the network.
  • consumers are entitled to competition among network providers, application and service providers, and content providers.”

There are inherent tensions and ambiguities in these principles.  Further, in order to make these policies enforceable it is necessary to craft meaningful rules to properly address them.  Further, the Policy Statement reflects current views of the Commissioners at the time it was issued. Currently, only two of the five FCC Commissioners who were present when the statement was adopted are currently serving. One Commissioner is already planning to leave to join the Rural Utilities Service.  Will their votes on future proceedings be the same as those of the commissioners who signed the Policy Statement? What happens when the next Commissioner is appointed?  Hearings for two or three Commissioner, including the Chairman will be held in about three weeks.

I feel compelled to talk about the Comcast Peer to Peer case.  There are, however, other cases which might be more interesting. but this is where the FCC has already attempted to apply these four principles. What Comcast was doing was using re-set packets to stop the transmission of files in various peer-to-peer networks, notably BitTorrent.  What is most interesting is that Comcast was only resetting the connections when non-Comcast subscribers were receiving files from Comcast subscribers.  Again this is a diagonal Network Neutrality issue.  The reason Comcast engaged in this practice was probably to conserve network capacity for the files its subscribers deliberately wanted to exchange, not just offered to passively exchange.  This would improve network performance for its paying customers without Comcast having to invest in adding additional capacity.  This behavior was in fact rather difficult to detect at first since most Comcast subscribers who could complain, would only observe better performance. The practice was only first notice by a network engineer who was a Comcast subscriber.  He was making his uncopyrighted Barbershop Quartet music making freely available on BitTorrent.  This is not the kind of music which would have a huge following; however, he was surprised to find that absolutely no one was downloading it. The fact that Comcast felt it could do this suggests that it felt it had some form of power. Further, Comcast had not disclosed this practice to its subscribers.  It is questionable whether if disclosed, Comcast subscriber would change providers.  However, if every ISP were to engage in this practice, then all peer-to-peer networking would collapse.

After an AP story, in November 2007, Free Press, a public-interest organization, filed a complaint against Comcast and petition for declaratory ruling with the FCC.  The FCC launched a proceeding against Comcast for failing to follow its Policy Principles, claiming jurisdiction to enforce federal policy.  The FCC never alleged a violation of law or one of its rules.  Instead, launched what was really an administrative proceeding combined with an enforcement action.  In the adjudicatory proceeding, the FCC sought to determine whether Comcast’s actions were violating consumers’ right to “run applications and use services of their choice,” and the degree to which Comcast’s action might constitute “reasonable network management practices.” In addressing the latter concern, the FCC inquired whether Comcast’s network management practices were “carefully tailored to its interest in easing network congestion.”

This might strike you as an odd approach.  Even so, the FCC does have the legal authority to do so, and there is precedent for this.  In the end, the FCC found that Comcast was violating its policy and ordered it to:

  • precisely disclose to the Commission its network management practices;
  • submit a compliance plan with interim benchmarks; and
  • disclose to the Commission and to the public the details of its future network management practices.

In the end, the Commission called on Free Press, Vuze and others in the Internet community to vigilantly observe the practices of ISPs and to bring complaints about those behaviors to the Commission.  I think that the FCC’s approach produced an appropriate result in the instant case, despite procedural concerns. Perhaps this is because the Comcast violation was egregious.  I do not think this is a good way for European regulators to go in the future, or the US for that matter.

Network Neutrality concerns have been raised in Europe (for example, by the BBC’s iPlayer).  Network Neutrality manifests itself very differently, and much less problematically, in Europe than it does in the United States.  To begin with, Europe today enjoys a far more competitive broadband market than does the United States. On average, more than half of all retail DSL lines in Europe are provided by competitive entrants.  That said, trying to address Network Neutrality challenges through ex ante regulation is likely to prove extremely difficult.  It is no different from the problems the FCC has faced.  Thus, the first line of defense for European policymakers should instead be to avoid the problem altogether by maintaining the competitiveness of the underlying markets.  Occasional or sporadic problems related to Network Neutrality might be addressed ex post through the exercise of competition law.  Finally, the European regulatory framework affords European regulators more and better tools for addressing the problems.

In sum, we are still faced with the following dilemma:  on the one hand it is very hard to describe ex ante what is a serious and significant violation of Network Neutrality. On the other hand, it is very hard to make broad, sweeping concepts actionable or enforceable as rules.

The most effective way to promote welfare-enhancing differentiation as opposed to anti-competitive discrimination is the presence of effective, sustainable competition. This is, by no means, a guarantee. As several US experts correctly observe, the US has four major wireless carriers, but no truly open mobile networks. Nonetheless, in the absence of competition to constrain the behavior network providers, some form of regulation will be required. Once the regulator is required to dictate allowable and unallowable network practices, all of the options are unattractive. The market and technology moves too quickly for administrative or legislative management, making effective competition the best fix.  In the presence of effective competition, informed consumer choice and low switching costs, the market will punish welfare-diminishing discrimination.

This is easier said than done.  Managing competition is difficult.  This is especially true where there is an entrenched, powerful incumbent.  This leads to politicized rulemaking and even regulatory capture. Nonetheless, the profit motive is a sufficiently corrupting influence that it must be constrained. The best constraint is the behavior of numerous competing suppliers.  The absence of these constraints, the regulator must impose obligations. Or better yet, figure out how to introduce or reintroduce effective, sustainable competition.

The regulator should view itself as not dividing up a pie among rent-seeking incumbents.  Rather, it should seek policies which make the whole pie larger, by encouraging more participants, more network providers, and more content suppliers to going the network.

I thank you for your time and attention.

Highest use of spectrum

May 7th, 2009

When I was at the FCC, one of its stated policy goals was to ensure that radio spectrum was put to its “highest use”.  It now appears that one carrier is going to do precisely that, albeit not in the United States.  According to a report by Reuters, Nepal Telecom plans to extend its mobile network coverage to the summit of Mount Everest in the Himalayas.  This network will allow climbers upto the 29,035 foot summit to have access to terrestrial-based communications, without having to rely on expensive satellite phones.  This use of spectrum is an even higher use than the unlicensed spectrum employed at the Wi-Fi hotspot which China Mobile built at the Mount Everest base camp.  That’s only at 17,000 feet above sea level.

Insight:  I am not sure that this is the meaning of ‘highest’ the FCC intended when it chose the term.  Perhaps what was meant was ‘highest value use’.  However, adding that one little word opens a messy intellectual can of worms.  Does this mean highest monetary value use or highest social value use?  Monetary value is easy to determine.  Just look at who is willing to spend the most money to use the spectrum.  Social value is much harder to determine.  If we forgo social value for a monetary determination, we might have to give up such intangibles as public safety and national defense.  Good thing the policy goal has since been restated to promoting the “efficient and effective use of non-federal spectrum”.

Lobbyist-to-English Phrasebook

March 14th, 2009

When I worked at the FCC, I kept a running list of phrases bandied about by lobbyists.  Sometimes, these phrases entered the common parlance of the Commission without really being questioned.  Without being explicitly dishonest, I found these terms tended to distort the policy dialogue, and even permit regulatory capture.  Here are some selections from my Lobbyist-to-English Phrasebook:

Mobile TV – Translation: keep the status quo in the TV bands, which is probably the most inefficiently used public resource.  Any television with a battery is inherently mobile.  These things were all the rage when I was a kid in the 1970s.  People took them to ball games so that they could watch the instant replay from the stands.  If history is a guide, video programming will become one service running over multi-service, IP-based networks.

Spectrum Glut – Translation: keep the entry barriers for wireless networks high.  A spectrum glut is simply not possible.  Think about this carefully.  The contrapositive of a spectrum glut is that there is not enough harmful interference.  You cannot be too rich, too good looking, or have too much spectrum.  An indication of effective radio policy is that revenues from spectrum auctions would be at or near zero marginal cost.FN What the term is really arguing is that if spectrum resources are freely available to all wouldbe network operators, then there would be too many new entrants.  The flood of new entrants would cause compétition sauvage that all operators would go out of business, harming consumer welfare.  If the business process is not patentable, then it probably does not make sense to extend de facto intellectual property protections to it.  The FCC is not the PTO.

The US is a broadband leader – Translation: Some cherry-picked statistic to show that US is not lagging at broadband Internet adoption.  We beat Korea in broadband!!  Okay, okay, it’s North Korea, but they’re part of the Next Generation Access of Evil!

Encourage investment – Translation: corporate welfare.  Promoting investment in network is not an objective of communications policy.  The US tried this.  It was called rate of return regulation and it was a failure.  What is an acceptable objective is promoting innovative services at marginal cost.  Investment might be a necessary element to that, but it is not the objective.

Insight: As an MBA, I find this last one particularly disturbing.  A firm invests when the investment is reasonably expected to generate a super-normal rate of return.  Otherwise, management should return the capital to shareholders in the form of a dividend and let the shareholders invest that cash somewhere else.  Anything else is a breach of their fiduciary duty.

I recently discovered, that the US does not hold a monopoly on this problem.  Recently, ECTA (the European competitive carriers’ association) released a statement arguing that Telefonica in Spain and Deutsche Telekom were threatening their national regulators that they would not invest in their networks unless certain policy restrictions were relaxed.

Implicit in this investment-for-certain-policies argument is that certain policies might increase the amount of capital required for network investment or lower the cashflows associated with the investment, lowering the rate of return to an unprofitable level.  This is a fair argument.  However, in order to properly evaluate that argument, the carrier has to provide regulator with its financial model for its network investment decisions, including all assumptions.  Otherwise, this argument should be rejected out of hand for being unsubstantiated.  It is foolish for the regulator to assume that its actions have no consequences on the profitability of the firms it regulates.  However, it must examine the trade-offs inherent in its actions to obtain the best possible outcome.

In the final analysis, there are better vehicles for stimulating investment in networks such as intellectual property rights, tax policy, grants, loan guarantees, and industrial policy.  In most cases, the telecoms regulator has no authority to pursue these policies.