A week ago, the Dutch telecommunications regulator Agentschap Telecom completed a spectrum auction for licenses in the 2.6 GHz band.  Five bidders spent just over €2.6 million to acquire 130 MHz of the 190 MHz in the band, but they did so in an unusual way.  Agentschap’s auction had two parts.  In the first part, bidders vied for a certain amount of spectrum.  In the second round, the bidders competed for specific 5 MHz blocks, with the option of single 5 MHz blocks of unpaired (TDD) spectrum or 2 x 5 MHz blocks of paired (FDD) spectrum.  This determined the pairing the band.  No FDD spectrum was acquired.

In this way, the auction determined whether the spectrum would be used for cellular type uses (FDD) or for WiMax-type uses (TDD).  To my knowledge, Agentschap’s auction was only the second time an auction was used to determine not just assignment but allocation as well.  In 2008, ComReg in Ireland used a very similar auction in the 26 GHz band.

Insight:  In a previous Cool Stuff, I wrote about my work to design an auction which could not determine not only who gets the spectrum rights, but what the contours of those rights are.  I called this approach: Price-Guided Radio Policy.  Now, we have two data points to suggest that this approach can work and can efficiently determine not only spectrum assignments but allocations as well.

Don't try to bend the spoon.

In the classic 1999 film The Matrix, the protagonist, Neo, played Keanu Reeves, goes to see an oracle.  In the waiting room, he happens upon one of the oracle’s child disciples who is sitting zazen and melting a metal spoon with mind.

Spoon boy: Do not try and bend the spoon. That’s impossible. Instead… only try to realize the truth.

Neo: What truth?

Spoon boy: There is no spoon.

Neo: There is no spoon?

Spoon boy: Then you’ll see, that it is not the spoon that bends, it is only yourself.  (Source IMDB)

By the same token, I have long wondered if there is no radio spectrum.  This fact is among the reasons that the unlicensed regime works so well.  It is spectrum policy, just without the spectrum

The jurisprudence underlying the Part 15 rules is that unlicensed spectrum is not spectrum at all…. It is merely an idea – a concept – a way of describing and organizing the physical world in our minds and in our actions. Spectrum is a legal and engineering construct to control for an immutable fundamental physical property… (Source: Unlicensed to Kill)

The Part 15 rules simply consider what is the maximum amount of irradiated power which can be emitted by a device without an unacceptable probability of causing harmful interference.

However, most of spectrum policy other than the Part 15 rules deals with regulating the “airwaves”.  Yet treating radio operations as spectrum or airwaves or property is a false paradigm.  This point was driven home to me a few years ago when I was an FCC staffer.  I was once filling out my timesheet at the FCC.  One of the lines on the sheet was “spectrum” and it dawned on me that I was spending more than 66.7% of my time dealing with something which had momentum, but no mass.  Somewhat paradoxically, electromagnetic energy behaves simultaneously like a wave and like a particle, carried by photons.  This is an important and powerful observation.  In fact, it was for this observation (the so-called photo-electric effect), and not General or Special Relativity, that Albert Einstein was awarded the Nobel Prize.

So, while we are regulating the airwaves, who is regulating the photons?!

Insight:  I raise this issue now because just last week the FCC announced the (re)establishment of its Spectrum Task Force.  Honestly, I am not exactly sure what implications for radio policy of considering the dually of electromagnetic radiation as both a wave and a particle might be; however, going forward perhaps the STF should undertake critical rethinking of this crucial policy area from the basics up.

Since we cannot bend the spoon, perhaps it is time we bend ourselves.

The argument is that the widespread adoption of smart phones and mobile Internet has congested mobile wireless networks to the breaking point.  In order to alleviate congestion on their 3G or 4G network, carriers could offload traffic onto Wi-Fi networks (including those of other operators).  This would free up the carriers’ limited spectrum resources which they obtained at auction through the licensing process.  And, it could be done more cheaply than upgrading existing cell sites. (Dana Blankenhorn at ZDNet correctly points out the inconsistency of giving more spectrum to wireless carriers if unlicensed operation is the solution. It was not so long ago that wireless carriers were crying foul that all Wi-Fi networks such as the now defunct Cometa presented unfair competition because they had not spent billions to acquire their licenses at auction.)

Insight:  Integrating mobile networks with Wi-Fi is a good idea.  It is, however, not a new one.  At a conference nearly eight years ago at Columbia University and in the ensuing paper, I suggested that wireless carriers consider incorporating Wi-Fi into their networks.  My reasoning was not so much about load balancing as it was about market segmentation.  Complementing existing 3G networks with Wi-Fi would enable carriers to offer tiered services – a best efforts service and a better than best efforts service – charging different prices for both and increasing profitability.  I also suggested it would be possible to use spectrum not licensed to the carrier such as the spectrum which has been allocated to CB Radio,  GMRS, or FRS.  A 2003 FCC rule change would allow handsets cable of operating both on mobile networks and in these bands. In this way, carriers could offer services like push-to-talk or walkie-talkies without encumbering their already burdened spectrum and networks. Users would be able to speak directly to others in their area, even users on other carriers’ networks.  Alas, there was not much economic incentive for carriers to sell such handsets because it would reduce the mobile termination revenues which carriers charge one another (and eventually their subscribers) for completing calls over their networks.  However, with the balance of market power tipping away from networks and in favor of handset providers recently, it might be possible that we would see such enabled handsets in the next few years.

Spectrum band plan created by price-guided mechanisms

Winston Churchill famously said, “democracy is the worst form of government except all the others that have been tried.”  Perhaps the same can be said of spectrum auctions.  Auction mechanisms have been used starting in New Zealand in 1994 to award spectrum licenses to those who have the highest monetary value. Spectrum auctions have generally been highly effective, with the occasional failure.

Despite their success, auctions have some notable drawbacks such as the so-called winners curse and the fact the up-front license fees require spectrum users to raise capital beyond the princely sums necessary to build a wireless network – a barrier to entry.  However, auctions are far better than the administrative processes which have been used for nearly a century to determine spectrum assignments.  Administrative decisions tend not to be economically efficient because the regulator has limited access to information which market participants would be more able to amass and utilize. There are also problems of political independence and of regulatory capture.

While auctions have been used to determine who gets spectrum rights, they have not really been used to determine the contours of those rights.  These contours are still determined through administrative decisions.

I have just completed a major study on next generation spectrum regulation which can serve as the basis for removing certain barriers to spectrum access, allowing more effective sharing and efficient allocations.

I can think of no reason why a properly designed auction could not determine not only who gets the spectrum rights, but what those rights are.  (Think of it this way: an auction on eBay for a car could determine not just who gets the car, but the color of the car and whether it comes with, say, leather seats or alloy wheels.)  I built a mathematical model of a next-generation spectrum auction using the Shannon-Hartley Theorem as a means modeling behavior by valuing the spectrum when considering the actions of other would-be users.  In my model bidders could express their demands for not just bandwidth, but power, modulation, underlay/interference, and other characteristics.  When I ran an MS Excel-based version of the model, the result was a mix of high and low power uses in the winning bids.  The low power bidders (similar to UWB spectral densities) could in a second round be aggregated into some form of licensed commons with the coordination protocol determined in that part of the auction.  The outcome would resemble a shared use or common arrangement where no one party controlled the spectrum.  However, the most interesting thing was that because bidders could obtain spectrum allocations that more closely fit their needs, more than 40% of the spectrum bandwidth available in the auction was left unsold.  This spectrum was valued by the market to be best allocated to either public sector use or even low- to mid-power unlicensed use.

Insight:  You cannot see, touch, taste, smell, or hear radio spectrum.  Spectrum is not a thing; it is an idea – a legal and engineering construct that explains a physical phenomenon and helps us arrange our behavior accordingly.  That fundamental physical phenomenon is the fact that when electromagnetic waves are: (1) harmonic in frequency; (2) incident in time; and (3) alight on the same reception device, the ability of those waves to be used as information carriers is degraded.  This deleterious effect is known to us as interference.  Without some form of intervention, it is impossible to exclude or limit the use of a common resource such as spectrum. Without exclusion, users consume the spectrum without regard to fact that their usage causes the deleterious effect of interference for other would-be users.  Policies which help to mitigate inference with the least amount of effort will be the most socially beneficial.

The conference looked at the origin and evolution of the FCC’s Part 15 rules.  There were several interesting takeaways.  Most of these are lessons which we already know, but all too often take for granted.  Keynote speaker Michael Marcus reminded the audience that people frequently act in their short term interest, in a way in which they foreclose long-term opportunities for themselves.  Dr. Marcus described the regulatory battles of the 1980s during the FCC’s rulemakings where cordless manufacturers fought fiercely, opposing certain rule changes.  These rules now enable most of the cordless phones these manufacturers now sell.  The closing keynote, Dewayne Hendrix pointed out how spectrum policy the cognitive dissidence spectrum policy faces in affording interference rights.  We allow licensees to “whine” about interference when they use decades old technologies which do not have the ability to reject unwanted signals which more modern gear does.

Insight: In the US, there is no such thing as unlicensed spectrum.  Rather, and this is an important distinction, the FCC allows low power operation on a sufferance basis, proved the devices cause no harmful interference and accept all received by them.  Operators have a right, but not a vested right to continued operation.  The FCC has historically viewed the radio energy emission from these devices as not rising to a level sufficient to call “spectrum”.  This has left me wondering if there is no such thing as spectrum at all.  Spectrum is a legal and engineering construct to control for an immutable fundamental physical property.  When multiple electromagnetic waves, used as carrier waves to transmit information are incident in time, harmonic in frequency, and alight on the same reception antenna, they degrade one another’s ability to transmit information.  Next generation radio policy will focus more on solving the coordination/congestion problem, and not on “spectrum” per se.  (I also gave a really cool PowerPoint.  (Click to start, click to advance each slide after the animation stops).

Insight:  Fortunately, some of the FCC’s best and brightest have been working this issue.  In a previous Cool Stuff, I wrote about my FCC Working Paper, which lays out ideas for the implementation of economic congestion etiquettes which would allocate spectrum use in real time to its highest monetary value uses.  This approach could significantly improve the value society receives from the use of the radio spectrum, without the need for dangerous pharmaceuticals.

Insight: PSS service responders provide us with indispensable police, fire and other emergency services and the provision of emergency services extends beyond the social contract and invokes a moral obligation to protect life, welfare, and property. In order to enable the necessary broadband communications for next generation PSS communications, they will require two additional 15 MHz-wide blocks in the Digital Dividend bands. This allocation is on par with the 24 MHz which the US is reallocating from its DTV transition. A reallocation to PSS use cannot come soon enough since it may take more than ten years, to plan and deploy these networks.