A Dutch auction is typically one where prices go down. The auctioneer starts with a high price and then asks for lower prices. The first person to call out gets the item at that price. However, this is not how it worked in Holland last week.
A week ago, the Dutch telecommunications regulator Agentschap Telecom completed a spectrum auction for licenses in the 2.6 GHz band. Five bidders spent just over €2.6 million to acquire 130 MHz of the 190 MHz in the band, but they did so in an unusual way. Agentschap’s auction had two parts. In the first part, bidders vied for a certain amount of spectrum. In the second round, the bidders competed for specific 5 MHz blocks, with the option of single 5 MHz blocks of unpaired (TDD) spectrum or 2 x 5 MHz blocks of paired (FDD) spectrum. This determined the pairing the band. No FDD spectrum was acquired.
In this way, the auction determined whether the spectrum would be used for cellular type uses (FDD) or for WiMax-type uses (TDD). To my knowledge, Agentschap’s auction was only the second time an auction was used to determine not just assignment but allocation as well. In 2008, ComReg in Ireland used a very similar auction in the 26 GHz band.
Insight: In a previous Cool Stuff, I wrote about my work to design an auction which could not determine not only who gets the spectrum rights, but what the contours of those rights are. I called this approach: Price-Guided Radio Policy. Now, we have two data points to suggest that this approach can work and can efficiently determine not only spectrum assignments but allocations as well.

