Posts Tagged ‘next generation spectrum policy’

Spectrum Auctions in Japan?!

Wednesday, September 22nd, 2010

I was not the first to advocate for spectrum auctions, only the most vociferous.

The Japanese wireless market must be for Evan Kwerel akin to what the Duck-billed Platypus is for Charles Darwin. The Platypus is an egg-laying, venomous, duck-billed, beaver-tailed, otter-footed mammal, and would seem defy evolutionary theory.

The Japanese wireless market is well developed, with at least 5 competitors offering some of the lowest priced, highest speed, and most advanced networks of anywhere in the world. Yet, according modern economic theory, this should not be. The Japanese government has never held an auction to assign spectrum licenses. Economic theory suggests that auctions are more efficient (see, Cool Stuff) at assigning spectrum rights to their highest monetary value use than other means such as comparative hearings (currently used in Japan) or lotteries. If you are interested in auctions in Tokyo have been in Tsukiji –  the 5 AM fish market – has traditionally been your best bet.

Charles Darwin

If it walks like a duck, and talks like a duck… this makes no sense, it can’t be a mammal.

I have head rumors that the reason the Japanese government has never held spectrum auctions was not for fear of creating distortions in the market but so as not to upset the balance of power among the various ministries (i.e. Finance, Industry, Posts and Telecommunications). The US Treasury and the FCC got along fine once the FCC started sending enormous checks.

That might all change as the government of Japan is considering how it might employ spectrum auctions. A friend in Tokyo sent me a recently published copy of the Cabinet’s decision on a new strategy for growth.  Item 35 on page reads as follows:

電波の有効利用のための制度の見直し (1)割り当て済みの電波について、より必要性の高い用途に利用できるよう、既存の利用者を他の周波数へ速やかに移行させ、迅速かつ円滑に周波数を再編するための方策について平成22年度に検討、結論を得、平成23年度に措置する。 (2)再編に要するコストについて、再編後の周波数を新たに利用する者が、市場原理を活用して負担する等、オークション制度の考え方も取り入れた措置について平成22年度に検討、結論を得、平成23年度に措置する。

Tsukiji

Maguro auctions at Tskiji.

My Japanese is not so strong, but if you read this in context as Kasumigaseki Bungaku (roughly, “Beltway Literature”), as I was admonished, you can interpret this mean that the Cabinet is directing the Ministry of Information and Communications to review how market forces can be employed to rapidly and efficiently reassign radio usage rights. According to my vague understanding of what is suggested, the MIC will pursue a limited use of auctions to reassign spectrum licenses. Auction prices will be limited to the costs of relocating the existing users from the band. The MIC will then auction participant’s bids as part of its analysis in some sort of comparative hearing. License winners will have to pay their bid eventually.

Auction Theory in Tsukiji

Ken, we want you to rework the Part 15 Rules for sashimi - we'll call it “Unlicensed and Uncooked.”

Insight: To be fair, I think this is a really clever idea, but am not convinced it will work. For my Next Generation Spectrum Policy study,  I considered a very similar idea, whereby the spectrum management authority would have access to pricing information to make band-planning determinations. This idea is, in fact, the origin of the term I coined for the study, “price-guided policy.” I eventually rejected the idea before concluding the study because I became convinced that as long as you are going through the trouble to hold the auction, you might as well have it do all of the hard work up to and including assignment. I am very curious to see how this develops. I am not sure whether auctions will make the Japanese wireless market more advanced, or whether they will simply screw things up. I will keep you posted.

Next Generation Spectrum Regulation

Wednesday, December 9th, 2009
Spectrum band plan created by price-guided mechanisms

Spectrum band plan created by price-guided mechanisms

Winston Churchill famously said, “democracy is the worst form of government except all the others that have been tried.”  Perhaps the same can be said of spectrum auctions.  Auction mechanisms have been used starting in New Zealand in 1994 to award spectrum licenses to those who have the highest monetary value. Spectrum auctions have generally been highly effective, with the occasional failure.

Despite their success, auctions have some notable drawbacks such as the so-called winners curse and the fact the up-front license fees require spectrum users to raise capital beyond the princely sums necessary to build a wireless network – a barrier to entry.  However, auctions are far better than the administrative processes which have been used for nearly a century to determine spectrum assignments.  Administrative decisions tend not to be economically efficient because the regulator has limited access to information which market participants would be more able to amass and utilize. There are also problems of political independence and of regulatory capture.

While auctions have been used to determine who gets spectrum rights, they have not really been used to determine the contours of those rights.  These contours are still determined through administrative decisions.

I have just completed a major study on next generation spectrum regulation which can serve as the basis for removing certain barriers to spectrum access, allowing more effective sharing and efficient allocations.

I can think of no reason why a properly designed auction could not determine not only who gets the spectrum rights, but what those rights are.  (Think of it this way: an auction on eBay for a car could determine not just who gets the car, but the color of the car and whether it comes with, say, leather seats or alloy wheels.)  I built a mathematical model of a next-generation spectrum auction using the Shannon-Hartley Theorem as a means modeling behavior by valuing the spectrum when considering the actions of other would-be users.  In my model bidders could express their demands for not just bandwidth, but power, modulation, underlay/interference, and other characteristics.  When I ran an MS Excel-based version of the model, the result was a mix of high and low power uses in the winning bids.  The low power bidders (similar to UWB spectral densities) could in a second round be aggregated into some form of licensed commons with the coordination protocol determined in that part of the auction.  The outcome would resemble a shared use or common arrangement where no one party controlled the spectrum.  However, the most interesting thing was that because bidders could obtain spectrum allocations that more closely fit their needs, more than 40% of the spectrum bandwidth available in the auction was left unsold.  This spectrum was valued by the market to be best allocated to either public sector use or even low- to mid-power unlicensed use.

Insight:  You cannot see, touch, taste, smell, or hear radio spectrum.  Spectrum is not a thing; it is an idea – a legal and engineering construct that explains a physical phenomenon and helps us arrange our behavior accordingly.  That fundamental physical phenomenon is the fact that when electromagnetic waves are: (1) harmonic in frequency; (2) incident in time; and (3) alight on the same reception device, the ability of those waves to be used as information carriers is degraded.  This deleterious effect is known to us as interference.  Without some form of intervention, it is impossible to exclude or limit the use of a common resource such as spectrum. Without exclusion, users consume the spectrum without regard to fact that their usage causes the deleterious effect of interference for other would-be users.  Policies which help to mitigate inference with the least amount of effort will be the most socially beneficial.

The Bandwidth Dipstick

Thursday, July 31st, 2008

Yesterday, Prof. Tim Wu of Columbia Law School published an Op-Ed in the New York Times on the subject of bandwidth.  In the article, he compares bandwidth to oil in terms of its percentage of the average household’s expenditures and in terms of the cartels which produce it.  He says:

Like energy, bandwidth is an essential economic input. You can’t run an engine without gas, or a cellphone without bandwidth. Both are also resources controlled by a tight group of producers, whether oil companies and Middle Eastern nations or communications companies like AT&T, Comcast and Vodafone. That’s why, as with energy, we need to develop alternative sources of bandwidth.

While Prof. Wu’s might be right in his conclusions, I have to take exception to some of the points he makes along the way, particularly regarding cost of bandwidth.

To begin with, the price of oil is based, to some large measure, on the cost of its production and not necessarily the cost of its consumption.  The cost of production includes the cost to pump the oil out of the ground, refine it, and distribute it.  The cost of consumption would include the societal cost of pollution such as global warming caused by greenhouse gasses.  Here in Europe where a gallon of gasoline exceeds $9, most of which is tax, the retail price may better reflect the cost to society not only production but consumption as well.  The cost of the production of bandwidth includes both network CapEx and OpEx.  The cost of its consumption includes the negative effects of congestion felt by competing would-be users at times of peak use.  It is effectively zero, when use is non-rivalrous.  The price of bandwidth, as well as other resources subject to high negative externalities, should reflect the cost its production and consumption.  This maximizes the benefits which society obtains from the resource.

This is precisely why, contrary to Prof. Wu’s assertions, the FCC is working on such ideas.  FCC: OSP Working Papers #41, #42, and #43, on which I am a proud coauthor/collaborator, look at precisely these issues.  We designed and tested a system which instead of assigning spectrum in static blocks, would co-ordinate use of the spectrum to an efficient optimum.  Beyond the overly simplistic bandwidth dipstick, the FCC work also modeled other dimensions of performance, such as latency, and could be extended to include jitter, reliability, robustness, etc.  Nonetheless, the economic congestion protocols we developed would allocate bandwidth in real-time based on willingness to pay when there is congestion and it would be free otherwise.

To be fair, a business model which relies solely on congestion-based prices for its economic logic would not be sustainable.  Imagine an airline which would allow its passengers to fly for free, unless more passengers show up than there are seats, in which case it will charge all the passengers based on their willingness to pay.  One would expect such an airline to have very small planes, or, more likely, very large seats in its planes.  Without a way to ensure rivalry among its passengers for its capacity (i.e., seats), such an airline would surely go out of business.  Thus, a sustainable price for bandwidth must reflect the cost of both production and consumption of the resource.

Insight: I continue to tout these papers in my blog because they are important, cutting-edge work.  We sought to lay the groundwork for a better system which incorporates the best of the licensed and unlicensed approaches to spectrum access.  This system would be, to use Eli Noam’s words, would be “open, but not necessarily free.” As such, it would maintain sufficiently low barriers to entry, which would make it sufficiently difficult to obtain monopoly rents.  It would be nice if Prof. Wu would put forward some of the available solutions to “alternative supplies of bandwidth” in addition to pointing out the problems.