Posts Tagged ‘Network Neutrality’

Defining the Open Internet

Friday, November 5th, 2010

Earlier this week I was contacted by Seth Johnson who was organizing a response to the FCC’s Further Inquiry into Two Underdeveloped Issues in the Open Internet Proceeding.  Seth asked if I would consider signing on in support of joint comments which urge the FCC to consider appropriate distinction between the open Internet and “specialized services” in light of changes in the market. As I said in previous Cool Stuff, both basic packet Internet and specialized services are important components of a robust and diverse market place.  I jointed the statement along with 31 other distinguished experts in this field.

Here is what some of my cosigners have said in their blogs:

I am not going to rehash all of the bright, insightful things these experts have said – I will not do them justice.  I do recommend that you read them, though.

Insight: Both the open Internet and specialized services exist in the market, and have for some time.  However, this is an important juncture to define: 1) where one begins and the other ends and 2) what are the appropriate measures necessary to preserve competition and fair play.  I joined on the comments because it does not advocate a particular policy outcome.  Rather, we urge the FCC that by “addressing this distinction in itself enables the analysis and pursuit of policy goals to proceed with a profound new level of clarity.”  This is of particular national importance.  The Internet is an American invention.  It is and will continue to be an important ingredient to economic development and global competitiveness.

That’s not the Internet

Friday, August 27th, 2010

In my last Cool Stuff, I mused about the Google Verizon proposal on Network Neutrality and its implications pricing incentives and a two-tiered Internet.  The post received quite a bit of attention in blogsfera italiano (here, here, and here).  Since posting, I have continued to think about a tiered Internet.  I conclude that managed services already exist in the market place, but it is not the Internet.

Hovey Slide

Rich Hovey's Genius Slide

I keep coming back to a slide I stole have been using with permission from Rich Hovey for about four years .  While a triple play network may appear to be a single network, it is really three sharing the same wire or fiber.  Indeed, there might be three completely separate sets of network equipment attached at either end of the line – Internet modem, cable box, and phone terminal.  The video programming component is not neutral and certain shelf-space on the network have been reserved, and prioritized for certain applications.  But, that’s not the Internet.

I also am old enough to remember dial-up to online services such Prodigy, CompuServe, and AOL. Each service provider would offer its own content, plus some backdoor way, such as gopher or email, way into the public Internet. However, those online service providers were not the “Internet”.

The Internet is an interconnected, end-to-end, packet switched network.

Insight: There is nothing inherently anticompetitive about broadband service providers marketing managed services.  There is also nothing new about it.  However, it would be false advertising to claim it is the Internet.

Taking the Roof off of the Internet

Wednesday, August 18th, 2010

The recent legislative proposal on Network Neutrality proposed by Google and Verizon would “allow broadband providers to offer additional, differentiated online services, in addition to the Internet access and video services (such as Verizon’s FIOS TV) offered today.”  Some critics have argued that that the deal would create a two-tiered Internet, one upper tier for differentiated services and one lower tier for commodity packets.  The first could swallow the second, as ISPs try to up-sell their customers to higher margin products.  So, in short, the basic Internet will get crappier and the managed Internet will get more expensive and less open to competing sources of content and applications.

There is some strong precedent for this criticism since it is not a new economic phenomenon.  Emile Dupuit observed of the French rail system in 1849:

It is not because of the few thousand francs which would have to be spent to put a roof over the third-class carriage or to upholster the third-class seats that some company or other has open carriages with wooden benches … What the company is trying to do is prevent the passengers who can pay the second-class fare from traveling third class; it hits the poor, not because it wants to hurt them, but to frighten the rich … And it is again for the same reason that the companies, having proved almost cruel to the third-class passengers and mean to the second-class ones, become lavish in dealing with first-class customers. Having refused the poor what is necessary, they give the rich what is superfluous.

As I wrote in a previous Cool Stuff, I am not inherently opposed to two tiered pricing.

Stevenson's Rocket

Sometimes even an economist will spend £5 to ride in an open carriage, if it makes his kid happy.

Even in common carriage networks there has been tiering and prioritization, such as business and economy classes in rail and air transport, for example.  In traditional a telephone networks, there was tiering. Although every one got VGS (voice grade service), under the Bell System there was still business and residential classes of service.  The network was capable of certain forms of call prioritization in emergencies, calls to 911, calling out prioritization over calling in, and GETS (Government Emergency Telecommunications Service).  There was also prioritization based on first-in-time.  The telephone network was designed to handle only fraction of capacity, and on occasion, you might get an “all circuits are busy” message when your call was blocked.

More troubling than a two-tiered Internet is the in the way which the deal could misalign economic incentives.  The Google-Verizon deal could change to the way networks compensate one another for carrying traffic to their respective customers, if the content or application provider is paying for better service on the enduser’s network.  There are basically three ways networks can compensate one another: calling-party-pays; receiving-party-pays; and bill-and-keep.  Money changes hands as their names suggest.  Bill-and-keep is the way most Internet traffic is exchanged (peering).  It works well when the networks are roughly equivalent in size, traffic flows, and cost-causation.  Receiving party pays is how most cell phone networks exchange traffic in the US.  It provides pretty good economic incentives.  The problem with the Google-Verizon deal is that it could be, in effect, a calling-party-pays arrangement.  Without regulation, these arrangements provide the opportunity for carriers to shift costs to rival networks and engage in other system-gaming.  When dealing with a “termination monopoly” such as an Internet connection, traffic should be exchanged under receiving party-pays or bill-and-keep arrangements.  The termination monopoly exists anytime there is only one network which can terminate traffic to a network end point.  It is surprisingly durable.  Even when there is a healthy number of competitors in access networks (fixed or wireless), once a subscriber chooses a particular network, he forecloses all other ways for other network participants to send him traffic.  It is in the termination network’s interest to keep prices low for its subscribers and charge high costs to other networks’ subscribers. In the current case, this fact is Okay for Google because it has lots of cash.  However, its competitors and start-ups might not be able to pay for such termination.  In this way, the Google-Verizon deal could in the long run serve to limit others from the market place.

In the end, either competition or regulation has to constrain this behavior.

Insight: Google Verizon proposal is not so much a threat to network neutrality (lower case) as it is to network economics.  Part of this is the public face of a private bargaining game. Players in the value chain are using the political and regulatory process as they struggle to gain a larger share of that chain.  It is not evil, merely self-interested.  That is fine.  At some level, Google and Verizon should be lauded for working towards a compromise and to move things forward.  But, they should not get to make public policy.  That is the exclusive domain of Congress and the FCC.  The FCC should take those views into account then offer its own independent decision to impose regulation or not.  Professors Susan Crawford and Lawrence Lessig (both of whom I admire very much) get this exactly right in their Op-Ed last week.  If Google and Verizon want to offer an internet without a roof, the FCC should make sure that another company is able to offer a competing one with a roof.

Solving Network Neutrality

Thursday, August 12th, 2010

Much has been said in regard to the recent Google-Verizon proposal on Network Neutrality and the collapse of talks at the FCC.  The rough consensus is that the deal would create a two-tiered Internet.

Is a two-tiered Internet a bad thing?

Honestly, I don’t know.  On one hand, it offends my basic sense of fairness.  On the other, my economics training tells me the price discrimination is a good thing (in competitive markets).  I have been thinking, writing, and speaking (in that order) on Network Neutrality for about four or five years.  My work has been published in English, Japanese, and Italian is forthcoming.  The one thing I have consistently said is that Internet subscribers, when well-informed, with real competitive options, and faced with low switching costs, will punish ISP who are not giving them what they want.  Competition is deputizes consumers to vote with their wallets.  If a two-tiered Internet is a good thing, then a competitive market will support it.

Almost all commenters agree that the cause of Network Neutrality issue is the reduction of competition in Internet access in the US.  This follows from a series of FCC decisions which basically eviscerated its local competition rules (mostly in the form of unbundling) in favor of “market solutions”.  The major proceeding which changed these rules was the Triennial Review.  In the proceeding, incumbents told the FCC that unbundled network elements (UNEs) were bad because they discouraged investment.  The competitors argued that UNEs were good because they were necessary for network competition.  I find both of those statements true and not mutually exclusive.  It is possible for a well-intentioned, well-informed regulator could split that baby down the middle, and still throw out the bath water.  In other words, regulators can create an effective unbundling regime which mitigates the disincentives to invest while still enabling competitive entry.  Indeed, nearly every other industrialized country has some form of unbundling for local competition.

What makes this difficult in the current political climate is that UNEs and TELRIC are incredibly dull.  It is much easier to get people excited about a topic like Network Neutrality than long-run incremental costs.  So, you cannot generate the political will for a return to unbundling.

Insight: There is now a unique opportunity to move beyond the Network Neutrality debate.  However, regulators should regulate, not negotiate.  The FCC should take this opportunity to revisit its unbundling rules to craft rules which can enable competition in Internet access networks while mitigating disincentives to invest.  Time to get excited about subloops!!

Network Neutrality and the Samurai

Sunday, January 10th, 2010

The ITU Association of Japan just published my September keynote on Network Neutrality in the Highlights section of its January 2010 ITU AJ Journal. (The article is in Japanese).

One of the points I made in the keynote (which is not in the brief article), was an analogy of Network Neutrality issues to Edō Period Japan.  The sankin kōtai laws of the Tokugawa Shogunate imposed a rule of prioritization on the Tokaido and Nakaseido roads between Edō (now, Tokyo) and Kyoto, as well as on other “kaido” emanating from the capital.  Access to Japanese roads was prioritized by social status, with only the Samurai class having access to the center of the road as their procession called a daimyo gyoretsu passed.  Lower classes were required to clear the road kneel down and bow as the Samurai passed.  Punishment for failing to clear the road was possible decapitation.

The concept of prioritization is not new, but it is universal.  It expresses fundamental and competing notions of fairness versus economic efficiency.  We think it is unfair to give preferential treatment to certain customers (those who are willing to pay more or have higher social status).  At the same time, we also think it is economically inefficient to mandate a single (or limited set of) Internet access options for everyone, including those who are willing to pay more for premium services.  When the network (or Tokkaido Road) is congested, prioritization can make users better off.  Prioritization can be accomplished based on economic characteristics, arrival order, processing load, urgency, or even social status.

Insight: Since all messages on an IP-based network travel at the same speed (the speed of light), in discussions of Network Neutrality, it is never who gets to go faster, rather which packet, or which samurai, gets to go first.  Such prioritization must be done in a way which is socially permissible and economically desirable.  Given that the penalty for breaching a classes of service restrains in Edo Japan was capital, I think I would rather get a reset packet.

Japan Communications’ New Business Model

Wednesday, October 28th, 2009

On my October business trip to Tokyo, I took time to meet with Japan Communications‘ CEO Frank Sanda.  I know Frank from my work on the Eamon Ryan’s Advisory Forum on Broadband.  I wanted to see Frank and his team because they just launched a new product for Hewlett-Packard.  HP will now sell netbooks in Japan which come with 100 minutes of mobile wireless connectivity. Consumers can buy connectivity on a pay-as-you-go basis from Japan Communications, but branded as an HP service.

Japan Communications built a really cool billing system to handle payment and authentication.  But, Japan Communications does not have a wireless network.  That it gets from the leading carrier NTT DoCoMo. Japan Communications leases capacity on DoCoMo’s network nationwide, and has the ability to purchase more capacity as this business grows. HP gets to determine which devices are sold and can sell the connectivity as its own.  Furthermore, Japan Communications could set up such a system to sell anyone else’s networked devices.  Say, how about a Carterfone?

While Japan Communications negotiated with DoCoMo to get on its network, it was able to do so because the Japanese Ministry for Communications and Information created which rules opened the networks of three largest wireless operators DoCoMo, KDDI, and SoftBank to wholesale. There was apparently a three-year battle at the Ministry in which Japan Communications was at the center. Japan’s policy to require wholesale access to wireless networks goes further than the US FCC’s rules for its 700 MHz auction which mandated these open these networks to foreign devices and handsets.

Insight: This seems like a really cool business model with implications for carriers, devices manufacturers, and application service providers around the world. I have said in a previous Cool Stuff, it is not a question of whether wireless networks should be open or closed. Rather, there is some optimal level of openness which will maximize the carrier’s return.  A privately determined level of openness will no doubt diverge from a level of openness which represents a public optimal. However, this begs the question whether opening networks to wholesale in this way is good policy and whether the Europe and the US should follow suit.  The answer is far more complex than can be addressed in a humble blog entry.  Nonetheless, I am curious see how this market will develop.

Stefano Merli’s Net Neutrality Paradox

Saturday, May 16th, 2009

Source: foxypar4, flickr.com.  Used with permission.

Source: foxypar4, flickr.com. Used with permission.

This past week, I gave a keynote speech in Rome on Network Neutrality.  At lunch afterwards, I had a lovely conversation with Italian researcher Stefano Merli.  He presented me with the following paradox:  The theory of Network Neutrality is that we impose rules to ensure openness and, more importantly, freedom of use on the Internet.  However, the imposition of a rule, by its very nature, limits freedom. Thus, we are limiting freedom to ensure freedom.

Insight:  It’s an excellent paradox.  The only resolution which I could come to is that the regulator, on behalf of private citizens, imposes rules on network operators.  While restricting the operators’ freedom affords private Internet users greater freedom of use.

So, I wonder if this is a ‘transfer’ of freedom from one group to another, how do we know that we have the correct set of rules.  Then I thought of the weight of cows.  What can the weight of cows tell us about Network Neutrality?  You might think I have gone mentally ill.  Indulge me for a moment.  If asked what the average weight of a cow was, you could venture a guess.  The quality of your guess, i.e., how close it was to the actual average, would be a function of your life experience.  If you grew up on a dairy farm or work in livestock, your guess probably would be closer to the average value than mine, because I grew up in Manhattan.  Now, if I asked a 100 people, or 1,000, or 10,000, then the average of those responses would tend to converge on the actual value.  This is the “Wisdom of Crowds“.   One of the most important lessons I learned in business school is one can be smarter than anyone in the room, but he can’t be smarter than everyone in the room. Vox populi, vox Dei.

Similarly, the set of Network Neutrality rules imposed by the regulator is, in essence, one person’s guess.  If we have thousands, or tens of thousands, of people ‘guessing’ at the appropriate rules – a market – then we will eventually converge on a correct value.

Neutralità della rete e aspetti socio-economici

Friday, May 15th, 2009

The conceptual foundations and the economics Network Neutrality

Remarks as Prepared for Delivery

Good Morning and thank you for that warm introduction.  It is truly a pleasure for me to speak to you this morning.  Before I begin, I would like to thank Stefano Quintarelli for inviting me and the Fondazione Ugo Bordoni for hosting me here today.  I would also like to thank Sebastiano Trigila and his staff for their terrific help in arranging this event.

We would like to think of Network Neutrality as being in the vanguard – one the leading edge issues in communications.  Well, while the implementations may be new, the ideas are old.  For example, in our research project at the WIK, we found a reference to an 1848 law in New York State which mandated that telegraph companies provide non-discriminatory service to individuals and to competing telegraph companies.  Substitute the word datagram for telegram, and you have a Network Neutrality regulation.

Yet, the debate goes back even further.  What is truly at the core of the debate is common carriage versus private carriage. It is in fact particularly fitting that we are here today in the Eternal City to discuss this ideas. Common Carriage – the duty to service all customers without discrimination – traces its origins to the laws of the Roman Empire.

As such, common and private carriage express fundamental and competing notions of fairness versus economic efficiency. We think it is unfair to give preferential treatment to certain customers (those who are willing to pay more).  At the same time, we also think it is economically inefficient to mandate a single (or limited set of) Internet access options for everyone, including those who are willing to pay more for premium services. So, how does one determine which means of achieving differentiated services is socially permissible and economically desirable?

The answer to that question depends on a variety of things.  The question itself is like a Rorschach test.  Look at Network Neutrality, tell me what you see, and I will tell you whom you work for, your educational background, your political ideology, your stock portfolio, and maybe even something about your personality.  This is perhaps why the debate in the United States created strange and almost surreal coalitions including the religious right, the American Civil Liberties Union, left-of-center netroots organizations and the Gun Owners of America.  Opponents on both sides of the issues agree on one thing, if their agenda is not adopted as regulatory policy, innovation and investment will be stifled and consumer welfare and overall economic activity will suffer.  Much of the public policy debate has been the external face of a private bargaining problem involving upstream content providers and downstream network providers.

The term Network Neutrality has come to describe all manner of sin.  There is no generally agreed upon definition for Network Neutrality and deviations or violations against the principle.   It is a catch-all phrase that emerged in the United States over the past decade and has come to reflect a number of potential behaviors that some have considered to be anticompetitive. Network Neutrality implies that all IP packets should be treated more-or-less the equally, and the debate reflects concerns that they might not be in the future – that a network operator might somehow apply different treatment to IP packets associated with different services, applications, destinations or devices.

The term Network Neutrality is, at best, a loaded one. It implies that any deviation from its principles is not neutral, and in some way unfair. In many instances, it is perfectly fair to provide preferential treatment to some network uses, say premium customers or emergency services. However, the opponents of Network Neutrality had devised a counter term which is almost equally misleading. In recent discussions involving the US FCC, the term network management practices has come to take the place of the term Network Neutrality.  While the semantics of this term might be more objective, it does not accurately describe the nature of the problem.  Network management refers to a much broader scope of activities including business practices, sales and marketing, security, fault tolerance, and capacity planning. Since the issues present in this debate represent only a narrow slice of network management.  This term was not picked at random, but comes from a US FCC decision which I will discuss a bit later.

Furthermore, Network Neutrality covers a broad range of behaviors, which at the extreme are clear acceptable or not clearly not acceptable.  Again, how do we decide which are tolerable which are not. The behaviors at the ends most people would agree are or are not acceptable.  The challenge comes in determining which of the behaviors in the middle are acceptable.  I fully expect that I will show this slide one day and be told by some Estonian botnet herder that customer requested SPAM filters are not acceptable under Network Neutrality.  This challenge is made more difficult by the fact that these behaviors can be insidious and difficult to detect.  Network operators are loathe to disclosing the precise contours of their network management for legitimate reasons of competitive advantages and network security.  Most Internet subscribers are not sophisticated enough to detect deviations from Network Neutrality on their own.

Well, further compounding the problem is the fact that Network Neutrality presents the classic problem of the elephant and the blind men. This may be due to the fact that a single network practice may give rise to several different economic, policy and technological issues, involving several different classes of persons. Given that there is little agreement on what exactly Network Neutrality is and there is no common language to describe the issues, I set out to create taxonomy designed to articulate and characterise different types of Network Neutrality issues.  It is my hope that this set of classifications will become widely used because it will give us a langua Franca to describe the things we disagree about.  I hope that this taxonomy will make the debate more objective and approachable, and help to reduce the ever-present hyperbole.

In order to describe the nature of relationships in an interconnected-multilateral-all-IP network world, we can characterize relationships among network participants and service providers as being one three dimensions: vertical, horizontal, or diagonal. Vertical conflicts are those between players in the value chain – content sources, network operators, and endusers. Issues between subscriber and provider are typically those of market power. Horizontal conflicts are those between persons in the same link of the network value chain. Horizontal conflicts arise between, says, endusers competing for finite bandwidth in the access network. The horizontal issues which arise are related to pool problems or issues of bargaining power.  Common pool resources are one type of economic good which is rivalrous and non-excludable.  That is a fancy way of saying that the inherent characteristics of the good make it such that one person’s enjoyment of it, diminishes another person’s, and there is no means of preventing individuals from consuming it. In common pool resources, people tend to consume the good without respect to their negative impact on others, leading to a level of consumption which might reduce overall benefit from the good.

Our so-called diagonal conflicts arise when the actions of one party affect the benefits received by a party on a completely autonomous network. Diagonal issues present the most fertile ground for the Network Neutrality debate and issues of first impression.  We observe many of the experiences of Network Neutrality arise when Internet-based networks insinuates itself into the communications and contractual relationships of users who do not directly subscribe to it. Consider the following situation depicted in the Figure, were entities 1 and 2 are access networks and A, B, and C are endusers. Further suppose that Networks 1 and 2 are interconnected, and endusers A and B are both customers of 1. C is a customer of Network 2. We use the vertical dimension describe the network participant’s place in the value chain, i.e., network provider or enduser. An example of a vertical issue would be Network 1′s blocking or degrading of non-affiliated content to its customers A and B. If endusers A and B are competing for network resources, this would be an example of a horizontal issue. Similarly, deviations from Network Neutrality in terms of interconnection between Networks 1 and 2 would also be along a horizontal dimension.  Somewhat more complex is an example of an diagonal issue which might be the case where Network 1 would block or degrade enduser C’s (who is not its customer) ability to exchange messages with its customer, enduser B. An example of this is the Comcast case which I will discuss later on.

Most people discuss the “speed” data networks.  This term is not precise. The more precise description is the end-to-end delay or data transfer rate.  For the Network Neutrality debate, jitter, and packet loss are also particularly relevant measures of network performance.

This transfer rate is much a function of latency and delay.  Delay in an IP network can be compared to waiting times on a ski lift. In the figure, skiers face a variable queuing delay when standing in line to get on the ski lift. The length of the variable delay is based on the number of skiers trying to get on the lift, and the number of skiers that can board per minute. Each skier faces a fixed delay (latency) once on the chair, based on the length of the lift cable and the constant speed at which it moves.  (I assume that the speed of the cable can not be increased). In this analogy, overall delay is the total time that it takes to get up the lift from the moment that one enters the queue at the bottom of the ski slope to the time that one disembarks at the top of the mountain.

The latency can be viewed as being roughly the time to get a packet through the network if there were no contention for resources whatsoever. For each communications link, it is a function of the speed of light through the transmission medium of which the link is comprised, and the length of the link (or the ski lift cable in this example). As long as the end-to-end communications path does not change, the latency of an end-to-end communication can be viewed as being a constant.

Queuing delays, however, are highly variable. For each transmission link in a packet’s path, the packet can be viewed as having been placed on a waiting line (a queue) while it seeks to gain access to the transmission link. The routers that forward packets have substantial buffers in which they maintain waiting lines of packets; however, these buffers are not unlimited. If the offered load is greater than the capacity of the link, the waiting line will get longer, and will eventually overrun the size of the buffer, no matter how large. Routers respond to this condition by simply discarding excess packets, which normally causes no harm for data applications such as email.

Nothing can make the network (or the ski lift) go faster. Rather, prioritised queuing determines which packets are delayed more (or dropped altogether) when the network is heavily loaded or overloaded. Consider again the analogy of the ski lift. When the waiting lines are long, we might wish to be favoured by a prioritised express line.  So, in discussions of Network Neutrality, it is not who gets to go faster, rather who gets to go first.

If we all were the same there would be little concern for Network Neutrality or for regulation for that matter.  But we are different and we differ in a variety of dimensions.  These two diagrams show how different applications require different things from the network.  Some applications such as two-way video require high bandwidth and low overall delay.  While email, might only require low bandwidth and can tolerate higher latency.  At present, we are putting heterogeneous demands on what was largely designed as a homogeneous network.  This is sure to cause conflicts as heterogeneous users contend for limited capacity.

Let’s talk for a moment about access networks.  In discussing Network Neutrality issues, we tend to focus exclusively on access network issues because this is where competition issues tend to be the most problematic.  Consider a plain-vanilla broadband internet connection.  All of the capacity in the circuit can be used for just about any IP-based application.  Now consider a more complicated cable- or fiber-based network.  While it may appear to be a single network, it is really three, or so, networks sharing the same wire or fiber.  Indeed, there might be three completely separate sets of network equipment attached at either end of the line – Internet modem, cable box and phone terminal.  When we talk about Network Neutrality, we tend to focus solely on the Internet component.  But the other networks, certainly the video programming component is not neutral.  Certain frequencies in the network have been reserved, and prioritized for certain applications.  So, why such a focus for the Internet component? Perhaps this is because it is the most important for the future of communications.

Many of the concerns that have been raised in regard to Network Neutrality relate to behaviors that, in the absence of market power, would tend to enhance consumer welfare. In a competitive market, these practices would be entirely appropriate.  Competition is one of four essential ingredients for mitigating the negative impacts of deviations from Network Neutrality.  The other three are: well informed consumers; low switching costs; and economic feedback loops that provide proper incentives.  The presence of these four factors means that regulators have less work to do in order to ensure that welfare-enhancing differentiation does not devolve into welfare-diminishing discrimination.  Network neutrality also brings into play economic issues including price discrimination, network externalities, transaction costs, switching costs, two-sided markets, and the economics of vertical foreclosure.  Only some of which I will talk about today.

Opponents of Network Neutrality intervention frequently point to the most common problems and claim that this is a two sided market, which if left to its own devices will sort out an efficient, market clearing price.  A two sided market is a fairly common arrangement where a market maker, must successfully bring together participants in two classes of persons in order to make a profit.  The classic example is the bar owner who may give away free drinks at a “lady’s night” ensure a sufficient number of women in order to attract men as paying customers.  In networks, this might be the cable television provider who must attract a certain number of viewers in order to attract program provides and to be able to sell advertising, and vice versa.  In some cases, the programmer is selling advertising and in some cases the cable provider is.  Two sided markets can be complex in that subsidizing one side with zero, or even negative prices, can be rational and even welfare enhancing.  Now imagine that we are talking about the Internet.  Here the threat to Network Neutrality is the market maker attempting to extract a rent from the programmer’s advertiser – someone with whom he does not have privity of contract.  This is, to use the language of our three dimensions, a diagonal issue.  The fear of this “toll gate” problem is probably what brought together strange coalitions in the US.  It probably would not fly in a competitive market, since it has little to do with bringing the two sides together.  Where there is little or no competition, it is most likely an unacceptable practice.

Let me change gears a bit and talk about Network Neutrality in the US.  Why did it take so long for Network Neutrality to become a real problem in the US? Deviations have been technically feasible for more than ten year.  Telecommunications firms in the US were not permitted to discriminate (prior to 2005), but cable operators were unrestricted. The problem has heated up in the US coincident with the decline of competitive broadband alternatives for consumers.  This was also coincident with an aggressively deregulatory time period.

In August of 2005, the FCC adopted a Broadband Policy Statement. This statement does not have the enforceable weight of a Commission rule, but the Commission committed to incorporating these principles into future policymaking. The policy principles in the Statement were intended to “ensure that broadband networks are widely deployed, open, affordable, and accessible to all consumers.” The Statement further set out four entitlements for consumers which it felt necessary to further this goal:

  • consumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet content of their choice.
  • consumers are entitled to run applications and use services of their choice, subject to the needs of law enforcement.
  • consumers are entitled to connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm the network.
  • consumers are entitled to competition among network providers, application and service providers, and content providers.”

There are inherent tensions and ambiguities in these principles.  Further, in order to make these policies enforceable it is necessary to craft meaningful rules to properly address them.  Further, the Policy Statement reflects current views of the Commissioners at the time it was issued. Currently, only two of the five FCC Commissioners who were present when the statement was adopted are currently serving. One Commissioner is already planning to leave to join the Rural Utilities Service.  Will their votes on future proceedings be the same as those of the commissioners who signed the Policy Statement? What happens when the next Commissioner is appointed?  Hearings for two or three Commissioner, including the Chairman will be held in about three weeks.

I feel compelled to talk about the Comcast Peer to Peer case.  There are, however, other cases which might be more interesting. but this is where the FCC has already attempted to apply these four principles. What Comcast was doing was using re-set packets to stop the transmission of files in various peer-to-peer networks, notably BitTorrent.  What is most interesting is that Comcast was only resetting the connections when non-Comcast subscribers were receiving files from Comcast subscribers.  Again this is a diagonal Network Neutrality issue.  The reason Comcast engaged in this practice was probably to conserve network capacity for the files its subscribers deliberately wanted to exchange, not just offered to passively exchange.  This would improve network performance for its paying customers without Comcast having to invest in adding additional capacity.  This behavior was in fact rather difficult to detect at first since most Comcast subscribers who could complain, would only observe better performance. The practice was only first notice by a network engineer who was a Comcast subscriber.  He was making his uncopyrighted Barbershop Quartet music making freely available on BitTorrent.  This is not the kind of music which would have a huge following; however, he was surprised to find that absolutely no one was downloading it. The fact that Comcast felt it could do this suggests that it felt it had some form of power. Further, Comcast had not disclosed this practice to its subscribers.  It is questionable whether if disclosed, Comcast subscriber would change providers.  However, if every ISP were to engage in this practice, then all peer-to-peer networking would collapse.

After an AP story, in November 2007, Free Press, a public-interest organization, filed a complaint against Comcast and petition for declaratory ruling with the FCC.  The FCC launched a proceeding against Comcast for failing to follow its Policy Principles, claiming jurisdiction to enforce federal policy.  The FCC never alleged a violation of law or one of its rules.  Instead, launched what was really an administrative proceeding combined with an enforcement action.  In the adjudicatory proceeding, the FCC sought to determine whether Comcast’s actions were violating consumers’ right to “run applications and use services of their choice,” and the degree to which Comcast’s action might constitute “reasonable network management practices.” In addressing the latter concern, the FCC inquired whether Comcast’s network management practices were “carefully tailored to its interest in easing network congestion.”

This might strike you as an odd approach.  Even so, the FCC does have the legal authority to do so, and there is precedent for this.  In the end, the FCC found that Comcast was violating its policy and ordered it to:

  • precisely disclose to the Commission its network management practices;
  • submit a compliance plan with interim benchmarks; and
  • disclose to the Commission and to the public the details of its future network management practices.

In the end, the Commission called on Free Press, Vuze and others in the Internet community to vigilantly observe the practices of ISPs and to bring complaints about those behaviors to the Commission.  I think that the FCC’s approach produced an appropriate result in the instant case, despite procedural concerns. Perhaps this is because the Comcast violation was egregious.  I do not think this is a good way for European regulators to go in the future, or the US for that matter.

Network Neutrality concerns have been raised in Europe (for example, by the BBC’s iPlayer).  Network Neutrality manifests itself very differently, and much less problematically, in Europe than it does in the United States.  To begin with, Europe today enjoys a far more competitive broadband market than does the United States. On average, more than half of all retail DSL lines in Europe are provided by competitive entrants.  That said, trying to address Network Neutrality challenges through ex ante regulation is likely to prove extremely difficult.  It is no different from the problems the FCC has faced.  Thus, the first line of defense for European policymakers should instead be to avoid the problem altogether by maintaining the competitiveness of the underlying markets.  Occasional or sporadic problems related to Network Neutrality might be addressed ex post through the exercise of competition law.  Finally, the European regulatory framework affords European regulators more and better tools for addressing the problems.

In sum, we are still faced with the following dilemma:  on the one hand it is very hard to describe ex ante what is a serious and significant violation of Network Neutrality. On the other hand, it is very hard to make broad, sweeping concepts actionable or enforceable as rules.

The most effective way to promote welfare-enhancing differentiation as opposed to anti-competitive discrimination is the presence of effective, sustainable competition. This is, by no means, a guarantee. As several US experts correctly observe, the US has four major wireless carriers, but no truly open mobile networks. Nonetheless, in the absence of competition to constrain the behavior network providers, some form of regulation will be required. Once the regulator is required to dictate allowable and unallowable network practices, all of the options are unattractive. The market and technology moves too quickly for administrative or legislative management, making effective competition the best fix.  In the presence of effective competition, informed consumer choice and low switching costs, the market will punish welfare-diminishing discrimination.

This is easier said than done.  Managing competition is difficult.  This is especially true where there is an entrenched, powerful incumbent.  This leads to politicized rulemaking and even regulatory capture. Nonetheless, the profit motive is a sufficiently corrupting influence that it must be constrained. The best constraint is the behavior of numerous competing suppliers.  The absence of these constraints, the regulator must impose obligations. Or better yet, figure out how to introduce or reintroduce effective, sustainable competition.

The regulator should view itself as not dividing up a pie among rent-seeking incumbents.  Rather, it should seek policies which make the whole pie larger, by encouraging more participants, more network providers, and more content suppliers to going the network.

I thank you for your time and attention.

T-Mobile’s G1 Android and Apple iPhone: market power or just marketing?

Friday, February 13th, 2009

T-Mobile recently introduced its G1 mobile phone in Germany, the first to use the open Android platform. The G1 joins the more proprietary iPhone which T-Mobile has sold in Germany under an exclusive agreement with Apple. The G1 is manufactured for T-Mobile by HTC in Taiwan and the Android platform is an open standards effort of the Open Handset Alliance – a consortium comprised of Google and several mobile phone manufacturers and networks. By contrast, the iPhone is a more closed platform where modifications may result in it being rendered inoperable. Given that T-Mobile is embracing open and proprietary strategies for the operating systems, begs questions on the efficacy a hybrid business strategy and whether this is unfair competition.

Both the Apple and Android approaches have had to grapple with the optimal level of openness. No pure strategy is viable: too restrictive, and the phone is of minimal value; too open, and it becomes unprofitable. Originally, the iPhone’s operating system was derided as being overly restrictive. Apple tried to harness the energy of individuals trying to improve the iPhone by launching the App Store in July 2008. It now boasts 15,000 third party applications for sale. At the same time, the Android platform is an open standard, not full open source. The source code carries an Apache license, so some extensions to the code may be proprietary. Further, Android’s Software Development Kit might allow Google to control an Android Market in a way which resembles the App Store.

Insight: It is not necessarily unfair competition for T-Mobile to be the exclusive source for both the G1 and the iPhone in Germany. Despite the 200 patents filed for the iPhone, it is not inherently irreproducible – save its cachet as a technocrati status symbol. Both Samsung’s Instinct and the RIM’s Blackberry Storm have already been launched to compete with the iPhone. Similarly, any other network could market a phone employing the Android platform. Whether these devices are better or worse is a matter of consumer preference. The fact that T-Mobile is now marketing phones based on both open and proprietary software suggests that neither approach is the Holy Grail of business models. T-Mobile initially launched the G1 in the US in order to compete with AT&T which is the exclusive sources for the iPhone there. The decision to sell the G1 in Germany probably embraces economies of scope and scale, more then the question of openness.

A German language version of this note, authored with Christian Wernick, will be published in Wirtschaftsdienst, available at: www.wirtschaftsdienst.eu.

Network Neutrality in Europe and the Ski Lift Line

Tuesday, January 27th, 2009
Source: WIK-Consult, photo courtesy of alexindigo, Flickr.com

Source: WIK-Consult, photo courtesy of alexindigo, Flickr.com

My study for the BNetzA (German telecoms regulator) on Network Neutrality in Europe has finally published.  (Don’t worry, it’s available in English).  In this study, we look at Network Neutrality – the catch-all phrase that emerged in the United States over the past decade to reflect a number of potential behaviors that some consider to be anticompetitive – and what the implications for European regulators might be.

The report reviews the economics that underlies the Network Neutrality debate, including price discrimination, network externalities, transaction costs, switching costs, two-sided markets, and the economics of vertical foreclosure. It also briefly reviews the technical aspects of quality differentiation for IP traffic (including packet delay, jitter and loss). It provides background on a number of alleged deviations in the U.S. (including Madison River and Comcast), and assesses the Network Neutrality concerns that have been raised in Europe (for example, by the BBC’s iPlayer). In the end, we conclude that Network Neutrality manifests itself very differently, and much less problematically, in Europe than it does in the United States.  The report also considers the ways in which the changes proposed to the European regulatory framework as part of the ongoing “2006 review” might strengthen the hand of European regulators, and at what cost.

Insight: Putting aside the regulatory analysis, I think that the two most important and far-reaching aspects of our analysis are the taxonomy of network relationships we created and the way we describe end-to-end latency in IP networks.  In order to describe the nature of relationships in an interconnected-multilateral-all-IP network world, we characterize relationships among network participants and service providers as being one three dimensions: vertical, horizontal, or diagonal. (See Section 2.3 in the report).  I am also very pleased with how we use ski lifts to explain of queuing and link delays in end-to-end latency. (See Figure 1 in the report).  It is my hope that these two approaches will make the debate more objective and approachable, and help to reduce the ever-present hyperbole.